South Carolina Law Review
Volume 7

Issue 1

Article 16

Fall 1954

Partnerships and Business Corporations
Rufus M. Ward

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ward, Rufus M. (1954) "Partnerships and Business Corporations," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 7 : Iss.
1 , Article 16.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol7/iss1/16

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Ward: Partnerships and Business Corporations

PARTNERSHIPS AND BUSINESS CORPORATIONS
RUFUS M. WARD*

The South Carolina Supreme Court has not been overly burdened with cases involving Partnership and Business Corporation Law during this survey period. Indeed, there has been no
case dealing directly with the law of Partnerships. The case
of Industrial Equipment Co. v. Montague1 is the only case
handed down during the survey period falling strictly within
the field of business corporate law.2
The Industrial Equipment Co. operated as a partnership
for some years prior to 1946, the partners being A, who was
President, and owned a forty-five (45%) percent interest in
the business; B, who was Secretary, and had a ten (10%)
percent interest; and F, who was Treasurer and General Manager, and owned the remaining forty-five (45%) percent
interest in the business. In 1946 this partnership was incorporated and A, B, and F became the sole stockholders and officers of the corporation in the same proportion as they had
formerly owned the partnership. The stock ownership in the
corporation remained the same until the latter part of 1950
when A and B sold their stock to F and his associates, after
which they retired from the corporation. This action was
brought in January 1952 by the corporation against A, a former officer and stockholder. The complaint sets forth several
causes of action, but the only one involved in the appeal is
the first cause of action, which alleges that from July 1946
to December 1950, A converted to his own use certain "bonus
volume checks" issued to the corporation which aggregated
over $18,000.00.
The answer of A, in so far as here applicable, admitted that
the checks in question had been cashed by him upon the suggestion of F and that the proceeds were then divided among
the stockholders of the corporation in the proportion of their
stock holdings, which had been the practice of the partnership for the four years prior to its incorporation.
*Attorney at Law, Spartanburg, S. C.; LL.B., Furman University.
1. 224 S.C. 510, 80 S.E. 2d 114 (1954).
2. Henry P. Moses Co. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 224 S.C.
193, 78 S.E. 2d 187 (1953), might be said to indirectly involve corporate
law, but the real question was one of taxation. See also, United States
v. Scovil, 224 S.C. 233, 78 S.E. 2d 277 (1953), involving priority between
landlord's lien for rent and Federal tax lien due by insolvent corporation.
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At the trial F denied the foregoing allegations of the answer, claiming that he not only did not know of the cashing and
distributing of the proceeds of such checks, but that he received no part thereof. The Jury, however, found for A in
this respect.
On appeal the Court held: (1) That in the absence of claims
of creditors or other third persons, a distribution of corporate
earnings to the three corporate officers, who were the sole
stockholders and owners of the corporation, did not make the
corporation president, who made the distribution, responsible
to the corporation for conversion of corporate funds, and that
the absence of formal directors' meetings and minutes are
not indispensable to corporate action in this regard; and (2)
that where directors are the sole stockholders of a private business corporation they are the corporation itself and the usual
fiduciary relationship between the directors and their dealings with corporate property disappears.
In holding that under the facts of the particular case dividends could be paid without formal corporate action, the Court
follows and probably extends the doctrine as set forth in
Alderman v. Alderman3 which states that from a purely practical standpoint, where the only two legal stockholders of a
corporation were devoting their full time to its operation and
conferring constantly with each other, there would be little
occasion for having formal meetings. While this holding seems
to be in accord with the better view, 4 it will be interesting
to observe whether such doctrine is further extended. There
might be some merit for the position that if a so-called "close
corporation"" can legally operate and declare dividends without the holding of stockholders' and directors' meetings, that
it is in effect being allowed to use the veil of the corporate
entity as a screen to avoid personal liability on the part of
its owners.
The Court goes on to hold, in the case under survey, that
while, generally, corporate directors are at least quasi-trustees
in their dealings with the property of their corporation and
the relationship is fiduciary in nature, 6 where the directors
were also all of the stockholders in the business corporation
3. 178 S.C. 9, 181 S.E. 897, 105 A.L.R. 102 (1934).
4. 13 Am.Jura. 909, § 948; 19 C.J.S. 96, § 751.
5. The Court said Industrial Equipment Co. was a "close corporation."
6. Gilbert v. McLeod Infirmary, 219 S.C. 174, 64 S.E. 2d 524, 24
A.L.R. 2d 60 (1951).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol7/iss1/16

2

1954]

Ward: Partnerships and Business Corporations
SURv Y oV SoUrH CAROLINA LAW

they may be said to have been the corporation itself and such
fiduciary relationship disappears because one cannot be a trustee of property for himself. As authority for this conclusion
the Court cites Lynch v. Lynch7 holding that where one is
named trustee of property for himself, the trust relation disappears.

7. 161 S.C. 170, 159 S.E. 26, 80 A.L.R. 997 (1930).
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